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The ROKN is engaged in anti-infiltration operations which call for unlimited
time of ships underway. The operation will continue until our political situation
improves to the level of the two Germanies. Korean military forces have a primary
mission which is obviously military readiness and our vulnerability to North Korean
special forces infiltrations places a high priority on anti-infiltration operations. This
situation generates high pressure on the ROK military forces. Therefore, the purpose
of this study is to develop an optimum organizational structure which will give
flexibility in dealing with those two conflicting missions.
Primary research data exists in the experiences of the other Navies which gives
basic impetus to this study. Fortunately, the USCG has partially implemented a multi-
crew system. The mission and constraints of the USCG share of the USCG share
similarities with the ROKN and the ROKCG. Those two Korean services try to
achieve organizational effectiveness through optimization of given resources. For the
additional mission, increasing time of the ships underway is a primary concern which
can be accomplished by redesigning the organizational structure.
In this thesis, comparisons between various manning models are studied.
Secondly, barriers in implementing change in other services are identified, especially the
ROKN. Thirdly, appropriate approaches to overcome the common barriers are
proposed.
Ultimately, a structural design is selected which best matches the organizational
environment of the Korean Navy as a fast patrol force.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the beginning of 1968, the Korean Navy planned to build fast patrol boats of
85 foot length, manned with twenty-four combat crewmen to bring balance between
the Navy forces of North and South Korea, as well as for anti-infiltration operations.
In January of 1968, North Korean Special Forces invaded South Korea with the
objective of killing the President of South Korea. Even though their attempt failed, the
guerrillas infiltrated to Seoul, the capital city of South Korea. Similar incursions
continue today. Therefore, in addition to their other missions, all South Korean
military and police forces are engaged in anti-infiltration operations. South Korean's
enormous vulnerability to North Korean infiltration forces the engagement of all
available resources to perform these operations.
A. MISSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREAN NAVY
Basically, the Navy has two conflicting missions: The primary mission is
preparedness for international armed conflicts. The second is prevention of North
Korean infiltration.
Organizationally, the Navy consists of three fleets:east, west and south. Each
fleet operational area has been divided into three subsections for anti-infiltration
operations. The commanding officers of the subsections have the primary
responsibility for this kind of operation. The primary mission of the east and west
fleets is preparedness for conflict, and the south fleet mission is safeguarding
transportation routes from attack by the North Korean submarine force.
B. RESOURCE COSTRAINTS, GEOGRAPHIC, MANPOWER, AND OTHER
The primary yardstick for comparison of naval forces is the number and type of
ships. This is the primary material resource of any navy. The Republic of Korea Navy
(ROKN) vessels can be gouped into three categories: 1) Anti-Submarine Warfare
(ASW) vessels, 2) patrol boats, and 3) mine sweeping, amphibious, and other support
ships [Ref. 1: pp. 327-338].
Another division could be old style and newly constructed vessels. According to
the ROKN's plan for modernization of naval forces, the ROKN will have five frigates,
twenty five corvettes, eleven patrol ship multi-missions (PSMM), and a hundred fast
light forces by 1989. Every year, the Navy builds two or three frigates, four corvettes,
four light forces, and a small number of other navy vessels. The reason why the Navy
has relatively many light forces is, first as a counter strategy against the North Korean
Navy and second for increasing the anti-infiltration operation forces. The North
Korean Navy has approximately six hundred forty navy vessels which are mostly fast
light forces, including twenty two submarines. Therefore, the ROKN should sustain
ASW forces and fast light forces.
Human resources can be divided into two groups: One is career, and the other is
non-career thirty month term service personnel. According to Korean law, every male
adult has an obligation for national defense. Another characteristic is that the Marine
Corps is subordinate to the Navy. Although the Marines have their own culture and
organization, which is completely different from the Navy, all of their support systems
are operated by the Navy. These various ingredients create group conflicts, like those
between career and non-career personnel (including officers) concerning work, attitudes.
The Marines have some dissatisfaction concerning personnel policy and other current
support systems. Total manpower of the Navy is generally inadequate to meet their
performance requirement. This kind of problem is not only limited to internal Navy
organization. Currently, the ROK military system is changing to a geographic
divisional command and support system. Therefore, all the different branches are
supported through one common organization by geographic area.
Certainly, maintenance facilities are not direct combat forces, but these are a
kind of utility or infrastructure. The Navy has one main maintenance complex, which
has the ability to perform the highest levels of maintenance. Each fleet has its own
maintenance facility which has only a limited ability to deal with boats of less than a
hundred feet. Therefore, larger vessels must go to the main shipyard for overhaul.
Normally, the larger boats go to each fleet to perform their missions and go back to
the main shipyard for one month maintenance after three months operation. This
greatly reduces crew time with their families. The crews regard this one month
maintenance term as time underway, since they are away from their families. On the
other hand, some crew members maintain their families near the main shipyard, since
the normal assignment term for officers is one year and for enlisted crew is two years
or more. Therefore, those crew members maintain their home base near the shipyard
and view other assignments as temporary hardships.
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The Navy has various ship systems, and even the same type of vessels have
different equipment which makes it difficult for the Navy to keep skilled and
experienced work forces. What a crew member learns about the operation of
^equipment on one ship may not be useful when he is transferred to another ship. Since
there are few suitable ports on the east and west coasts of Korea, ships assigned to
those two fleets normally spend little time in port, even though they may not really be
at sea. For example, the tide on Korea's west coast is one of the highest in the world;
Thus Naval vessels cannot tie up even when they are in port.
The fact is that both sides of the Korean Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) have the
highest concentration of military forces in the world. A total of over a million military
personnel are engaged on both sides of the four mile deep DMZ. The DMZ extends
into the Yellow Sea and the Bay of Korea. Therefore, because Korea is still officially
at war, being technically in a ceasefire period, a high level of military preparedness is
required.
The situation at sea is even worse. The demarcation of the DMZ is more
obscure. The North Korean Navy has twenty two submarines which greatly threaten
South Korea which doesn't have any submarines.. Another critical geographic
disadvantage for anti-infiltration operations is that the ROK territorial water is close to
other nations' territorial waters, including China and Japan. North Korean enjoys this
advantage for their anti-infiltration operations. Their clandestine operations regularly
infiltrate through other nation's territorial waters and are safe from ROKN
surveillance. They sometimes masquerade as ships of a third nationality. In some
cases, ROKN action against suspected North Korean agent boats, which turn out to
be vessels of another nationality, has caused international political problems which
normally results in punishment for the commanding officer.
Another aspect is that the ROK has more than three thousand islands, which is a
great disadvantage to the Navy since there are so many areas with inadequate radar
coverage. A small geographic advantage is the high tide which allows North Korean
infiltrators only certain times in which they can infiltrate the mainland. Near ROK
territorial waters, many fishing boats are active throughout the year. Identification of
hostile vessels is a major problem. The ROK has no diplomatic relationships with
nearby communist countries, therefore, sea transportation has immeasurable
importance to the nation. All foreign contact is by sea or air.
11
There are two reasons why the total manpower of the Navy is inadequate to
meet the requirement: 1) older destroyers require higher staffing levels, and 2) the size
of the fleet is increasing as new ships are built each year. The ROK has made a
decision to increase the number of naval vessels but has limited total staffing
authorizations. Moreover, the high personnel turnover rate and lack of commitment
and efficiency on the part of non-career personnel affect productivity in the Navy. The
high turnover rate is partly caused by the perception of availability of improved
compensation in other areas of the Korean economy.
The Navy recently changed its promotion system which resulted in longer time in
grade between promotions. Two years ago, the time in grade requirements for
promotion was one year as ensign, two years as lieutenant (junior grade), and three
years as lieutenant. That has changed to one year as ensign, three years as lieutenant
(junior grade), and five years as lieutenant. The main reason for the increased time in
grade requirement is that the Navy's table of organization has been reduced compared
with ten years ago. The Navy manpower policy changes quite often. Ten years ago,
classes at the Naval Academy graduated one hundred fifty ensigns. Today only one
hundred ensigns are graduated. Competition for promotion is more intense because
failure to gain one of the limited number of promotions may result in release from
service prior to eligibility for retirement benefits. Some otherwise qualified officers see
greater opportunity in civilian life. The remaining personnel must strive to be well
educated and productive in order to compete for the limited number of promotions.
Moreover, the current Navy promotion system is slower than the other services. This
is a major factor affecting the Navy members' morale.
The ROK Navy culture follows a pattern similar to the US Navy. The core
assumption' is that a Navy officer should be a line officer. The line officer is the
dominant force in the Navy. Among line officers, Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW)
specialists have been regarded as the dominant group. Other officer specialties are
more technically oriented, and require more specialized education. Therefore, the
support and technical specialists have been enjoying the advantages of advanced
education.
Also, the career track of line officers is difficult to maintain, since once they get
assignments out of the Navy's main line, they have a hard time returning to a line
position. Therefore, few line officers have an opportunity for long term education.
The temporary absence from the mainstream could become permanent. Also,
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crewmembers, might more easily permit poor performance. Even if this is not true,
there is great reluctance on the part of senior personnel to attribute a high sense of
loyalty and responsibility to junior members of the crew. This kind of problem is the
basic reason why few Navies implement a multi-crew system. Even where authorized,
like in the USCG, it has been implemented only partially.
B. US EXPERIENCE WITH MULTI-CREWS
1. US Navy Case
Traditionally, the US Navy has been manned with a single crew system. In
this Navy, I studied two types of modification: one is in ballistic nuclear submarines
(SSBN) which have two entire crews per ship; the other one is oceanic research ships
that have crew assignments in excess to their authorization. These two kinds of
modification derive from their specific missions. The SSBN should be able to stay at
sea with high readiness for nuclear war. Regardless of whether it is peace or war time,
a certain number of submarines are on sea patrol. Also, the crew's mission is primarily
waiting orders for launching their missiles, which keeps the crew in high tension.
Adverse working conditions on the submarines, including maintaining silence, might
cause psychological problems for the crew. The crew's mental health is extremely
important in the submarine service, since the crew deals with enormously destructive
weapons. Also, ballistic missiles require regular maintenance every seventy days. These
specific conditions increase the advantages of implementation of a multicrewed
manning system. The submarine is manned with two entire crews, identified as gold
and blue crews, and change each seventy days while the loaded missiles are discharged
for investigation. Once the blue crew delivers the boat to the gold crew during the one
week transition period in port, it is free to engage in training or recuperative activities.
During the one week overlapping period, both crews check the inventory and sign the
transfer of responsibility. This period is the only time that the two crews meet each
other. The rest crew participates in education, vacation, training, and assignment to
other light duty activities.
Currently, the Chief of Naval Operations announced that the Navy has
difficulty maintaining dual-crewing on their submarines, since the Navy doesn't have
enough submarine qualified officers. But, the Navy still wants to keep their specific
manning system for effective achievement of the mission of the ballistic submarine.
Tactical submarines are single crew vessels. Most married crew members prefer the
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dual-crew system over the single crew submarine assignment since the dual crew system
gives them more time with their families and they can plan their time schedule.
Unmarried crew members sometimes look for single crew assignments because the
young crew members consider the attack submarine mission to be more exciting, i.e.,
searching for the enemy instead of just awaiting action [Ref. 3]. But, some higher
ranking crew members prefer a single crew system, even on ballistic submarines, since
they believe that the single crew system is better for maintaining crew morale and
keeping team spirit among their crew. Lower ranking crew prefer to be assigned on
dual crewed ships. Basically, this kind of manning system can hardly avoid
maintenance problems which should be viewed as group conflicts between the two
crews. The ballistic submarine has a higher maintenance priority than any other Navy
vessel. For example, the ballistic submarine's least maintenance priority is the same as
the attack submarine's highest priority. Therefore, malfunctioning equipment could be
easily replaced, even though the gold crew might blame the blue crew. One of the crew
interviewed said that the SSBN really has three crews. The reason is that each crew
blames some other crew, resulting in blame for an irresponsible crew, other than the
blue or gold crews.
However, in this case, highest possible priorities for resupply and re-equipping
indicates that sufficient resources could reduce conflicts. This condition is as Jeffrey
Pfeffer states in his book, Power in Organization. Normally, ballistic submarines cost
three what it costs to operate attack submarines. Since the maintenance priorities and
systems are different from each other it is impossible to compare ballistic submarines
with attack submarines in terms of cost benefit analysis. Over all, the ballistic
submarine case doesn't show much conflict between crews [Ref. 4].
But, the evaluation system has to be improved, so that each crew is evaluated
separately, even though they are based on the same platform. If the gold crew
performs well, then the blue crew can enjoy the gold crew's good job. But, if the gold
crew erred the blue crew might have a hard time to correct the gold crew's poor
performance. As far as I know, the submarine officers and the crew are highly
qualified and carefully selected members who are proud of their skills. Their job
confidence contributes to their high performance, since it does not allow poor standard
of performance.
Therefore, the problems which are associated with crew members' poor
performance might be a minor problem. Although each crew separately maintains an
acceptable level of performance, the noncommonality between the two crews may still
cause inefficiency. Can one ship with two crews be considered a single organization?
It is necessary to take actions which will bind these two crews into one unit.
Personally, I believe this problem should be carefully considered and team building
theory might be an appropriate means. Team building activities could be done during
the crew overlap period. Another dimension of multi-crew system is that the U.S.
Navy doesn't utilize the rest crew during the seventy days in port time during which
the crew is mostly assigned to education, training, and light duty. Even well prepared
training and educational courses will not be of significant importance to the crew if
they are repeated over and over again. Also, light duty is less meaningful and, it
appears to me, doesn't have productivity. Although the rest crew might not be
necessary to the Navy, keeping the highly qualified crew in an idle state isn't conducive
to highest morale.
The other multi-crew manning system is used on oceanic research ships which
keep more crew than required, usually one or more extra man per each functional area,
and excess crews have rest in rotation. Crew members are usually allowed a two week
leave during each six month cruise. It is normal for oceanic research ships to go sea for
a six month term. This kind of rest and recuperation leave is required for this type of
ship.
2. USCG
The US Coast Guard case has similarities in mission requirement and
environment with the Korean Navy. The mission requirement is that both services
require a high level of ships presence at sea with limited resources. Both services
heavily rely on small patrol boats for anti-smuggling and anti-infiltration operations.
Their operational concepts are similar, too. The two services boats are usually engaged
in actions four hours per day and those boats are deployed at each base as a squadron.
Additionally, the Coast Guard has partially implemented the multi-crew manning
system. Unlike the U.S Navy multicrewing experience, where boats of one type are
multicrewed and boats of another are not, the U.S. Coast Guard has single crewed and
multicrewed vessels of the same type. This difference is significant and offers
opportunities for comparisons between single crew and multi-crew manning systems
which cannot be made in the U.S. Navy system.
Basically, the Coast Guard has implemented several kinds of multicrew
manning systems: 1) two crews per ship, 2) one crew per ship with the crew operating
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as two crews, 3) three crews for two cutters, and 4) one maintenance team for several
larger cutters. The first system has two separate crews assigned per cutter and the two
crews rotate. One crew is at sea while the other crew is in port for rest or training.
This kind of manning system is similar to the US Navy ballistic submarine
multicrewing system.
In the second system, crew members are organized as one crew, but each
functional area has two specialists who can perform the job independently. There is a
common commanding officer and executive officer. For one period, the commanding
officer takes the cutter on assignment with half of the crew. During the next period,
the commanding officer and the returning crew are replaced by the executive officer
and the other half of the crew. But, there appears strong reluctance to implementing
this manning system since the seamen have strong loyalties. Therefore, the
commanding officers have a hard time letting the executive officers be in charge of
cutters. (The executive officer may be a senior enlisted man.) [Ref. 5].
In the third system, the three crews rotate their mission with two crews
engaged in action while the third crew is in port. After a certain time they rotate their
crews, with the "in port" crews swapping places with one of the two others.
In the last manning system, the maintenance team takes the cutter from the
crew for regularly scheduled maintenance, and the crew takes their planned action,
such as training or rest.
Eccles (1986) studys crew perceptions about multi-crew manning systems in
the U.S. Coast Guard. The summary of his study states that the strength of the
manning system is additional free time to crew members compared to the single crewed
ship. And the additional assigned manpower improves the ship's maintenance level
and increases productivity. Additionally, there is reduced fatigue that derives from
relief available by way of crew rotation. The negative perceptions or problems
associated with the manning system are" mainly inconsistency and lack of uniformity.
Poor communication and incomplete briefings during actual crew rotation results in
inefficient or redundant work distribution and unclear authority and responsibility.
Also, a lack of team spirit is demonstrated when distinct separations between crews
exist, resulting in level of training conflicts, and unhealthy competition between crew
members.
In some other Korean military services, particularly the Marine Corps and the
Army, a similar concept has been implemented. When they change their troops in
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DMZ, they set three steps for troop change. The first step is that new troops conduct
exercises near their area of responsibility, and secondly, the new troops exercise
together with the existing troops. During the combined exercise, the new troops will
build familiarity about their area of responsibility, like geographic and hostility
information. The new troop could develop familiarity during conduct of the combined
exercise. This exercise takes about one week. The final stage is withdrawal of the
former troop. This is the standard procedure of troop exchange in strategically
important areas of Korea. In another specific case, the Marines adopt more delegated
procedure on the company level. The procedure is that the new company sends half of
their troops to their assigned area receives half of the other company's members.
Finally, they change the rest of the members. The procedure takes around one month.
Certainly, the responsibilities are not technically the same as with Navy vessels, but the
idea of the replacement procedure is similar. Although the Navy has a more clearly
defined work area within the ship or boat, the geographic condition and other facilities
can be viewed as a system with which the new troop should become familiar.
During the study of the US Navy, I found many disciplinary experiences
which could apply to the Korean Navy. Especially, the transition phase from
conventional submarines to nuclear powered submarines revealed interesting contrasts.
One issue is that the diesel powered submarine officers felt that they were second class
citizens compared to officers on the innovative new submarines. The Korean Navy is
transiting from old fashioned vessels to newly constructed ships. Currently, the Navy
still uses both modern and older vessels. Therefore, some officers have experience with
new equipment, while others haven't. This is the similar situation to the US submarine
case. We should be aware of this kind of experience in other Navies.
3. Potential Benefits to ROKN
The biggest concern is that the Navy can maximize its resources utilization
through modification of the manning system, A cost benefit comparison study result
reveals a 44% increase of the ship's steaming hour with a 40% reduction of cost per
steaming hour. Also, the maintenance costs increased but the additional cost was only
11% [Ref 5: p. 40]. If we consider the cost of the newly built ships, then the
additional maintenance cost is not a big problem.
In addition, the Navy could improve crew morale which could be the most
significant benefit in dealing with the specific character of anti-infiltration operations.
The analysis of cost-benefits is discussed later.
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The Navy's morale problem derives from two reasons: one is that demands on
crew time are excessive. As a consequence, the crew finds it is hard to maintain their
private lives. Secondly, there are decreased opportunities for promotion coupled with
an "up or out" policy. Therefore, Navy members feel that their futures are unstable.
The prudent officer will contemplate his options.
Multi-crewing can allow the Navy crew to have more opportunities for
training, advanced education, and more time with their families. Many modifications
could be applied to the Navy. For the patrol boats, dual crewing might be proper, and
for the bigger ship, keeping the maintenance team might be appropriate. Current
diversification of the fleet forces and deployment at each area greatly reduces the
crew's in port time, since the Navy has only one main maintenance complex which can
deal with larger naval ships.
The results of the additional training and education made possible by
multicrewing will not be evident in a short period, but the effect will make a great
difference in the long run. The current study reveals that the additional training and
education is the most important motivational factor for organization members. The
Korean Navy line officers are surface specialty officers who are the actual work force
at sea and they tend to keep on the career track in the Navy. The current situation
doesn't allow them to have any advanced education. The current view is that academic
education isn't as valuable as military training for the Navy officer. The Navy suggests
many advanced educational courses, but the personnel policy problem associated with
the educational policy is that once a line officer engages in advanced academic
education he has difficulty maintaining his career track. Therefore, the line officer
finds it difficult to take that kind of suggested educational course which will benefit the
Navy in the future.
If the Navy adopts an alternative manning system which could give the line
officers more opportunities for education, then more qualified personnel will remain as
line officers. Normally, the top Naval Academy graduate officers change their
specialties to take advanced educational courses. Those specialties, such as
communications, instructor, supply, facility, etc., could take their required education in
some civilian universities. Also, education is of great concern to the officers since that
kind of advanced education will help the officer personally. A military job can not be
permanent. The most successful person can keep his career only about twenty five
years. What is the next step after the end of the military career? Obviously, the
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successful person can have another civilian or official job after retirement. How about
most other career officers, especially line officers, who haven't have any opportunity
for other advanced education? Although this cannot be the driving force behind
modification of the manning system, it certainly can be a side benefit which will be of
motivational value. The more secure an individual is about his future, both within the
service and after his retirement, the better will be his current performance.
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III. COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF MULTI-CREWING
The first step in a rational approach to develop a better alternative for the
Korean Navy organization through maximizing the utility of available human and
material resources is the identification of strengths and weaknesses of a multi-crew
system with cost benefit concepts. The study of the USCG is a comparison of
operating and maintenance cost between single crewed and dual crewed systems of the
United States Coast Guard (USCG), which have already been tried and analyzed by
other navies [Ref. 5].
A. SOURCE OF DATA
A comparative analysis was conducted between seventeen single-crewed and
multi-crewed ships, in three areas over a two year period. Basis for comparison was
resource hours and operating cost per hour, maintenance hours, and annual inspection
results.
Thirteen vessels, six conventional manned ships and seven dual crewed ships,
were stationed along the California coast between Eureka to the north and San Diego
to the south. They all had the same mission demand with similar operational
environments.
Also, two 95' vessels, home ported in Miami, Florida, were manned by three
rotating crews, and two other singlecrewed vessels were home ported in Key West,
Florida. Those different manned vessels were identified as units with geographic areas
of responsibility and mission requirements similar enough to make a comparison
reasonable, and the survey result showed a difference from 85' vessels.
The number of resource hours for each unit was acquired from the annual
summary of Operational Statistics provided by the office of Operations, Plans and
Programs Staff (Table 1).
The operating costs were obtained from the annual summary of Operating Cost
of Coast Guard Cutters provided by the Office of the Comptroller, Accounting
Division (O-FAC-6), Coast Guard Headquarters, Washington, D.C. The cost included
military pay and allowances, operating maintenance cost and fuel, electronic program
updates, vessel program updates, and miscellaneous costs.
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Table 2 is the annual ships' inspection results, which military persons regard as
representative of vessel readiness.
Following are the survey results.
TABLE 1
WPB RESOURCE HOURS AND OPERATING COSTS-FYS 84/85
; 82' SINGLE CREW
CUTTER NAME RESOURCE HOURS OPERATING COSTS MAINTENANCE HOURS
POINT BARROW 840/1 ,062 $297,558/272, 658 2 339/2, 705
POINT CHICO 952/1.038 $249,576/362, 924 2 147/2, 679
POINT HEYER 1 092/1 ,094 $272,095/387, 697 2 261/3, 433
POINT HOBART 1 234/1 ,409 $349,050/271
,
713 2 841/2, 439
POINT LEDGE 770/805 $439,451/495, 423 2 253/3 652
POINT WINSLOW 845/1 , 126 $320, 136/256, 348 2 138/2 838
AVERAGE ANNUAL 1 ,017 $331 ,219 2,643 8
82' DUAL CREW
POINT BRIDGE 2 579/2,470 $317,356/379, 489 2 081/2 901
POINT BROWER 2 459/2.068 $265,722/229, 292 2 145/2 021
POINT CAMDUE 2 330/2,063 $275,083/237, 127 2 203/2 643
POINT DIVIDE 2 296/1 .740 $320,364/329 018 3 022/2 617
POINT EVANS 2 268/1 ,829 $343,800/362 600 3 161/2 717
POINT SUDITH 2 024/2,279 $301 ,988/362 859 2 208/2 564
POINT STUART 2 457/1 ,690 $205,588/310 152 2 256/3 912




CAPE FOX 2 ,893/1 ,747 $337,296/474 895
CAPE YORK 2 ,767/2,080 $409,243/360 906
AVERAGE ANNUAL 2,372 $395,585
95'MULTI CREW
CAPE CURRENT 2 ,330/2,766 $553,884/388 979
CAPE GULL 3
, 124/906 $400, 341/452 088
AVERAGE ANNUAL 2.282 $448,823
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TABLE 2
FY 85 ANNUAL INSPECTION RESULTS FOR WPBS
82' SINGLE CREW
CUTTER NAME OVERALL MATERIAL NAVAL ELECTRONIC PERSONNEL
INSPEC INSPEC ENGINEERING ENGINEERING INSPEC
POINT BARROW E G G E G
POINT CHICO G
POINT HEYER E E G E E
POINT HOBART E E G E E
POINT LEDGE U E G G G
POINT WINSLOW E E E
82' DUAL CREW
*"
POINT BRIDGE E E E
POINT BROWER E
POINT CAMDUE E E E E
POINT DIVIDE





CAPE YORK E E NR
95'MULTI CREW
CAPE CURRENT E G E NR
CAPE GULL E G/E G/E NR
0: outstanding E: excellent G
:
good
U: unsatisfactory NR: not reported
B. DATA ANALYSIS
By definition, a cost benefit analysis (CBA) is "an estimation and evaluation of
net benefits associated with alternatives for achieving defined public goals." Cost-
benefit is a generic term embracing a wide range of evaluative procedures which lead to
a statement assessing cost and benefits relevant to project alternatives. Also, the
variety of problems addressed and the ingenuity which must be exercised in estimating
costs and benefits makes it particularly difficulty to design an all purpose CBA
procedure [Ref. 6: p. 48].
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Therefore, I intend to analyze the term Multi-Crew by the following criteria.
First, define the analysis areas which are under constraint of given resources-
human resource (number of crew) vs. material resources (ships). The human resource
dimension is not the number of crew members but. the manpower required to achieve
the stated organizational goals. In this thesis, the goal of the USCG is to prevent
smuggling, and perform search and rescue. The material dimension is the number of
Coast Guard cutters necessary to achieve the goals, which should not be confused with
improvement of the ship's ability to perform operations. Basically, the two factors are
complementing each other in performing the specific operations. To increase the
cutters' presenting time at sea, the two factors required can be traded of! under
consideration of the multi-crew concept. That is, a certain amount of time of cutters'
presence can be accomplished by a combination of different level of each resource.
Also, the required level of each resource can be determined by comparison of each
factor's impact on productivity. Therefore, there are two possible areas to be studied;
one is how much manpower is required to increase each cutter's effective operation.
The other one is how many crews are appropriate for a given number of cutters. The
first one requires a determination of the proper level of manpower per cutter. To
analyze the impact each of additional crewmember requires sensitivity analysis of
individual crew's performance, and relation between man and cutter's design. I intend
to analyze optimum crew staffing for one cutter, in order to establish that a multi-crew
system is more effective than single crew system in the specific operation.
Second, set a standard of comparison between multi-crewed ship and single
crewed ship's performance evaluations, operating cost, and maintenance cost. The
theoretical background to set a standard of evaluation will follow Sugden and
Williams's "Quantifying Cost and Benefit." It is not enough in cost-benefit analysis to
describe effects of a project as harsh, or slight, or moderate, or whatever.
Quantification is the aggregation of effects and the analysis of trade offs. Also, Sugden
and Williams emphasizes the importance of identification of all the relevant costs and
benefits, and they demonstrate a quantification method which can facilitate the
analysis.
Table 1 reflects that the average number of hours underway annually during
fiscal years 1984 and 1985 for the six single-crewed 82' WPBs studies was 1,017 at an
average annual cost of S33 1 ,219. The resulting cost per hour underway for this type
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unit was S325.68. The seven dual-crewed platforms proved significantly more
productive and efficient, with an average number of hours underway annually during
FYs 84 and 85 of 2,182.3 at an average annual cost of S302,S88. The resulting cost per
hour underway for this type unit was SI 38.79. The fact that the average operating
costs for a patrol boat with a smaller crew and less than half as many average annual
resource hours was higher than dual-crewing configuration necessitated a closer
examination of the breakdown of costs.
The data reveals that the average annual maintenance costs for the single-crewed
boats were 44% higher than for the dual-crewed boats, and vessel programmed updates
are scheduled independent of annual cutter operations, not a function of crewing
configuration. However, even after eliminating the approximately S25,000 additional
cost per single-crewed hull for this expense, the dual-crewed vessels cost slightly less to
operate per year and are more than twice as productive. Also, the six single-crewed
units required an average of 2,643.8 hours of maintenance per unit in order to
accomplish their average of 1,017 hours underway annually, or 2.6 hours of
maintenance for each hour underway. The seven dual-crewed units required an
average of 2,603.3 hours of maintenance to accomplish their 2,182.3 hours underway,
or 1.19 hours of maintenance for each hour underway. This increased opportunity for
maintenance performed by the single-crewed units may provide constructive
employment for the crew while in port, but does not appear to be necessary to increase
the utility of the platform.
An additional concern expressed during the study was that vessel maintenance
and appearance would suffer for lack of the full loyalty experienced with single-crew
unit ownership. However, Table 2 failed to show any significant differences
concerning maintaining the unit between the two crewing configurations, but the result
reveals dual-crewed units achieved slightly higher average rating in every category.
In the case of 95' vessels, the study failed to show the significant improvement of
productivity by implementation of multi-crew system. However, the two 95' vessels
adapted a different way of multi-crew system, and that will require more specific
organizational study. Since only two 95' vessels were involved, it is possible that these
figures are not generalizable.
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C. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
This simple analysis with limited data reveals that a multicrew system is more
productive or efficient than a single-crew system. But, the analysis only evaluated the
relationship between ship and crew on the divisional level, which may or may not
mislead decision makers. Therefore, I intend to evaluate more carefully by expressing
other possible impacts or consideration points which should require additional study.
Traditionally, cost-effectiveness analysis studies, which are the specific term of
cost-benefits analysis, are used in two different types of situation: 1) to maximize
output for a given amount of resources, or 2) to minimize costs for a given set of
objectives. Done properly, the ultimate outcome of the analysis should be the same.
So often, it is not possible to figure out the benefits to be obtained from a particular
social program. When this situation occurs, agencies can use a truncated version of
Benefit-Cost analysis.
In performing a cost-benefit analysis, an appropriate decision criterion is
required. Many criteria have been suggested as appropriate for evaluating alternative
investment projects according to the situation. Following are the common criteria used
in cost-benefit analysis [Ref. 6: p. 17]:
• NET PRESENT VALUE: This method has an advantage which is reduction o[
costs and benefits to a sinsle number in which costs or dollar benefits are
discounted. The major disadvantage of this is the determination of the proper
discount rate.
• BENEFIT-COST RATIO: This method, which is also defined in terms of
discounted value, gives the benefits per dollar of cost. Thus, the smaller of two
projects may have a higher B/C, yet yield a smaller total net benefit.
• EQUITY: This criterion addresses the impact of benefits and cost of a project
on the individual members of society. In the final analysis, the decision maimer
must subjectively weigh the NPV'of a project against any adverse equity
consequences. This will reflect the decision maker's own ethical standards, and
may also include political realities.
The identification of cost and benefit of a specific project requires following
assessment schemes [Ref. 8: pp. 17,24].
Internal vs external effects: In a simple case, internal effects are that the benefits
returned by an investment would be the revenues produced. In other words, the
internal benefits are those increases in value produced by the project itself.
External effects are those effects involuntarily received by others for which they
pay nothing. These effects are neither deliberately produced nor deliberately
consumed, and are also often called externalties, which can be classified as
technological and pecuniary.
29
Incommensurable vs Commensurable: Commensurables are those of a material
or economic nature, while incommensurables are those involving values beyond
economic. Also, incommensurables should be distinguished from intangibles as
differences that can not be readily translated into the common denominator or
denominators that are being used, and nonmeasurable in even their own terms.
Therefore, incommensurables refer to all extra-market effects and use intangibles
to describe quantitative terms that are noneconomic in nature.
The benefits of a multi-crew system can be interpreted as commensurable and
incommensurable: Increasing ship's presenting time at sea vs crew motivation.
Since the analysis was done under the divisional level, what are the additionally
required research areas at higher than divisional level. Implementation of the multi-
crew requires more crews than an additional number of vessels. In this, L'SCG cutters
are not as high value units as other Navy vessels, like nuclear submarines or aircraft
carriers. But, the term "economic war potential, in a nuclear period" should be
additionally considered for implementation in the Navy. Therefore, even the Navy
which has only conventional armed force should consider an appropriate requirement
of vessels.
The trade off between number of vessels and crews should consider each
additional cost, in terms of opportunity cost and relevant cost. The additional crews
require costs for recruitment and retention. Also, the additional vessels require cost for
construction and maintenance, furthermore other facilities which include additional pier
and increased maintenance facilities.
As stated previously, there are incommensurable factors associated with
implementation of multi-crew system. The increased productivity through
implementation of multi-crew system should be evaluated not only in hours of ship's
presence at sea, but also quality of crew performance. The data, Table 2, shows multi-
crewed units are better than single-crewed units. Also, defining the spillovers of the
two different systems are required. From implementation of multi-crew, the Navy can
offer more jobs, but reduce the revenue of the ship building company.
D. CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS
The performance of military service is hard to analyze in terms of cost-
effectiveness because it is hard to define the measure of effectiveness. Any
organization has certain kinds of constraints to achieve its goals, but we are required to
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achieve maximum effectiveness within given resources or minimize cost in given
effectiveness. In this study, I defined the resources as two categories-human and
ships. The Korean maritime services have traditionally manned their ships with a
single crew per vessel and a ship's operating schedules have been decided by the ship's
maintenance condition. The urgent action requirement doesn't allow consideration of
human factors. Overall combat readiness is determined by the maintenance condition
of the ship and the performance ability of the crew. Every year the ROKN builds
ships but still does not have enough to perform the added mission that calls for
increased presence of ROKN and ROKCG. It may be that now is the time to suggest
better working conditions for the crew. To increase the number of crew requires more
cost but that is still cheaper than building additional military ships.
The case of the USCG is strong evidence to support the benefit of the multi-crew
system. On the other hand, the reasons, it appears to me, why they stopped the
beneficial system are the justification why ROKN should consider implementing the
change. The barriers mostly came from psychological conflicts that could be
categorized in two forms-one is group conflict between crews; the other one is
resistance to change among the senior sailors. These barriers could be avoided by
improving organizational development techniques.
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IV. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN FOR MULTI-CREWING IN ROK NAVY
The purpose of this experiment is to identify and analyze the benefit and relevant
cost of a multi-crew system for the Republic of Korea Navy. Also, the well planned
implementation will give a better idea for the Navy. In a previous chapter, I have
introduced US Navy and Coast Guard cases and identified the benefits and cost of the
manning system, but the other navies' experiences might not be appropriate to the
Korean Navy, since the Korean Navy has developed their specific organization under
the different circumstance in their specific environment. More precisely, the other
navies' experience could give an adequate guide when changes could be made in small
increments. But the different services' experience will have major irreversible
consequences. Some basic organization theories, particularly Leavitt's organizational
model, describe organization as five dimensions: goals, people, techniques, structure,
and environment. Changes in one dimension require adjustment in others to insure
optimization of the organization [Ref. 9: p. 389].
Another theory is that the organization has three dimensions which are technical,
political, and cultural. Strategic change involves consideration of all three of these
organizational dimensions [Ref. 10].
The objective of this experiment is primarily improvement of the effectiveness of
the multi-crew manning system, and secondly, a guide for the Navy's strategic planned
changes from a traditional single crew manned Navy to a modified multi-crew manning
system. The Navy has two conflicting goals which are preparedness and additional
patrol missions which cause personnel dissatisfaction about their jobs and a high
turnover rate of the crew members. That phenomena could be interpreted to show
that the navy's structure is inefficiently organized and should be reconsidered. The
Navy designs their vessels to fit both mission requirements, but it is difficult to satisfy
two conflicting missions. The primary mission requirements are heavy armament
rather than high speed. The secondary mission requires high speed rather than heavy
armament. This compromise results in high construction cost and reduced armament.
Also, the Navy's small patrol boats are concerned mainly with the additional mission,
which requires quick reaction time with limited endurance. But, after a short high speed
chase, the boats drop speed rapidly.
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The organizational structure of the Navy causes difficulty, too. This is the
differentiation and integration problem. For the primary mission, the Navy forces
should keep concentration of their forces, but to perform the secondary mission, forces
should be distributed to each area with supporting facilities. To distribute the
supporting facilities calls for enormous costs.
Therefore, sometimes the forces are deployed temporarily. The people dimension
has two central issues: leadership and motivation. In order to achieve improved
organizational performance and to be able to strategically change an organization,
people must be motivated. Motivation is the willingness of an individual to invest
energy in specific activities. Thus, getting workers to produce a certain numbers and
quality of output per day is largely a motivational problem [Ref. 10: p. 86].
The Navy members regard this secondary mission as meaningless action since the
members do not feel any kind of achievement from the additional actions. Every year,
the Navy may succeed only a few times in the anti-infiltration operations. But,
compared to the numbers of forces which are engaged in that action, the operation's
productivity is very low.
Therefore, even though the additional mission has enormous importance and the
rewards for the successful crew members are great, still the crews are not motivated.
A. OBJECTIVE OF EXPERIMENT
This experiment will concern structural and technical dimensions of the Navy.
Moreover, this technical adjustment will be loosely coupled with another dimensional
cycle. Primarily, the modified manning system will affect the Navy's cultural
dimension, and finally it may affect the political dimension too. The basic assumption
of the Navy is that the traditional single crew manning concept is dominant in the
Navy, therefore people are worried about absenteeism which may be a result of
implementation of a multi-crew manning system. As the interview results of the Coast
Guard and the U.S. Navy reveal, higher ranking service members prefer a single crew
rather than a multi-crew manning system since they believe a single crew manning
system is more conducive to maintenance of crew morale and team spirit. I believe this
could be categorized as resistance to change and part of the cost of improvement of the
organizational effectiveness. Also, the environmental and organizational factors of the
two maritime services, US and Korean, are very different from each other. But, the
Coast Guard study result reveals increased effectiveness. The Korean Navy may
succeed in implementing this modification.
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In any case, it is my opinion that the existing manning system doesn't optimally
accomplish the two conflicting goals. Therefore, the objectives of this experiment are:
First, figure out the cost of the change in the Korean Navy, and find out the best
method. Secondly, regard this experiment as a step toward advancement and
preparation for the future of the Navy.
The first objective could be viewed as C = [ABD] > X which David Gleicher
has developed as a simple formula for determining whether change will occur.
C = change, A = level of dissatisfactionwith the status quo, B = clear desired state,
D = practical first steps toward the desired state, and X = cost of change [Ref. 11: p.
25].
This experiment can be regarded as a practical first step toward the Navy's
desired state which is accomplishment of the two conflicting goals in an effective way.
Organizational design is a technology that offers a wide range of possibilities, and
organizational change is an ongoing dilemma.
"Because organizations are perpetually in flux, undergoing shifts and changes, none of
the three problems is ever solved. At different points in time, any one of them, or
some combination, may be in need of adjustment. Adjustments in each of three
problem areas can be conceptualized in cyclical terms. These cyclical manifestations
overlap and interact with each other." [Ref. 10: p. 11].
If this experiment result is successful, then why not adopt the result. If it is not
successful, then what are the problems associated with the experiment, and how can we
remove the reluctance for the Navy's future improvement?
B. RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS / ESTIMATED COST
The experiment will be designed for a comparison of the current existing
organization with other alternatives. The primary resources of the anti-infiltration
forces are the patrol boats and crews (Table 3). The patrol boats configurations are :
•. Operating and maintenance costs are annual averages of the total forces.
•. Operating costs include fuel, payment, ammunition, food, and other
miscellaneous.
•. Maintenance costs include material resources, except laborcosts.
The additional resources requirements are different depending on the proposed
alternatives. The proposed alternatives are designed to follow the other navies
currently implemented manning systems. Each alternative has been designed with




SHIP TYPE Patrol Killer(PK) Patrol Killer-M(PKM)
CREW NUMBER 24-3 Officers- 28-4 Officers-






OPERATING COST S47,000 S71.000
MAINTENANCE COST S20.000 S3 3,000
CONSTRUCTION COST S2 million S4 million
ALTERNATIVE A: Two crews per ship
ALTERNATIVE B: Three crews for two ships
ALTERNATIVE C: One extended crew per ship
ALTERNATIVE D: One maintenance team per squadron
Additional resources requirements of Alternatives A, B, C, and D are:
Alternative A: One entire crew per ship
Retention cost of crew
Retirement Pension Fund for career personnel
Food services
Facilities for human resources
-Housing
-Training & Education
Alternative B: One entire crew for two ships
Retention cost of crews
Retirement pension fund for career personnel
Food services




Alternative C: Additional human resources are 9 personnel each, who could
augment the existing crew, providing two complementary
limited duty crews.
Obviously, navy vessels table of organization should be considered adequate only
to support the temporary pre-hostility capability. Therefore, the total human resources
requirement might exceed the basic essential number of operators. My concern is that
the anti-infiltration operation doesn't require the same level of staffing as would be
required to support the primary mission. Therefore, I derived the number of additional


























5 Deck 1 Quarter 4 Engine
4 Gunnery 2 R D 1 Damage Control
2 Comm 1 Electric
1 Medical
Additiona 1 human resources requirement
2 Gunnery 1 Quarter 1 Engine
1 Deck 1 Rader 1 Damage Control





























6 Deck 1 Quarter 5 Engine
4 Gunnery 2 Rader 1 Damage Control
1 Fire Control 2 Comm 1 Electric
Additional human resources requirement
2 Gunnery 1 Quarter 1 Engine
1 Fire Control 1 Rader 1 Damage Control
1 Medical 1 Electric
In the PK, the XO is in charge of weapons and operating departments, and the
EO is charged strictly with the Engine Department. In PKM, the XO is in charge of
the Weapons departments; the head of the Engine Department could be assigned to the
Engineering Officer and the Chief Engineering Petty Officer.
Another consideration is that the Korean Navy has identified Navigators and
Engineering Officers as line officers. The navigator is a line officer and eligible for
promotion to operating departments, Weapons Officer, XO and even CO. The
Engineering Officer is a specialist, strictly concerned with the Engine Department. The
Navy has recently decided to alternate these specialities from conventional
discrimination to cross functional utilization. According to the new personnel policy,
the navy will not identify Navigators and Engineering Officers. Because of this, one
separable crew has more realistic possibilities.
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Alternative D requires additional human resources for ship maintenance. This
alternative is proposed to make the crew free from advanced maintenance, since the
advanced maintenance facilities are located far from the ships' normal deployment
places.
t
Some crew members regard this advanced shipyard maintenance period as time
underway. Because of the geographic distance between their family location and the
maintenance facilities, the crew must be separated from their families. Another reason
is that the crews are engaged for maintenance during the in port period after three
month of action, which presents difficulties for relaxation and sea readiness. By
separating operation from maintenance the crew could utilize their in port time for
crew maintenance, like training and other varieties of work, which would enhance
concentration on their primary duties. To enhance this, the maintenance team should
be qualified to take responsibilities for their performance. More precisely, the team will
have to be composed of technically oriented personnel.
As I stated earlier, the Navy plans for junior engineering officers to have
opportunities as navigators. If lieutenant grade engineering officers are assigned as
commanding officer in charge of sailing from the separate squadrons to the
maintenance facilities, then they could gain experience in line jobs as well as in
operational areas. Since the activities of ships during this ferrying operation would be
limited, assignment of less than fully qualified commanding officers should not cause
difficulties.
I have been looking at apparent cost. But, to analyze the cost of future
implementation, all of the relevant costs have to be carefully considered: such as, what
is the training and educational cost for the increased members of the crew. And, as the
Navy implements the modified manning system, naval vessels' steaming hours will
increase, and it is anticipated that the total life cycle cost will increase [Ref 12: pp.
19,28].
Life cycle cost includes (1) Research and Development costs, (2) Production and
Construction Costs, (3) Operation and Maintenance Costs, and (4) Systems Retirement
and Phase-out Costs. In this thesis, among the four kinds of costs, Operation and
Maintenance Costs must be regarded as the cost of sustaining operations, personnel,
and maintenance support. Since, during the wear-out period, the failure rate of the
vessel increases rapidly, the wear-out period will come sooner than on a single crew
vessel.
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Additionally, in the long run, increasing human resources will cause increase of
pension payment for career personnel. The Navy should plan for utilization of senior
crew members. The Navy should alter the current table of organization for these senior
personnel to provide facilities, housing, etc. This is dependent on a decision concerning
the adequate level of personnel in the Navy.
The current situation in the Navy indicates little concern for the opportunity cost
of non-career personnel. Since every Korean male adult has an obligation of national
defense, payment of non-career personnel is low, and the overall direct cost for these
personnel is minor compared to other human maintenance costs.
C. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
My biggest concern in experimental design is, first, how to measure differences
between the conventional manning system and the modified manning system.
Secondly, how can we remove the negative side of anticipated consequences which is
revealed in the experience of other navies? Thirdly, how can we manage this manning
system more effectively?
The experiment has three phases: beginning, implementing, and evaluation. In
the beginning stage, unfreezing the current situation is the primary task. During the
implementation stage, transition will occur. Finally, review the experiment and evaluate
the results, which can be viewed as rephasing and beginning again (Table 6).
a. Begining Stage
The primary issue of this stage is that during the overall planning, participants should
be oriented and become involved in the planning. This will make the experimental
planning more explicit. To set the time table of the implementation, I propose a two
year plan, with two one year phases, since officer assignments are generally for a one
year term. During the winter time, most of the navy's light forces are engaged in
maintenance activites at maintenance facilities. The reason is that during the winter,
Korean territorial waters are unfit for small boat operations, and North Korean special
forces have difficulty conducting infiltration activities. As spring arrives, infiltration
activities increase and anti-infiltration activities increase apace. This continues until
winter arrives again. So, during January and February, the navy has to finish the
beginning stage and move on to the implementation stage.
The participating boats should be deployed separately, since if the
participants involved in the experiment are close enough to investigate each others
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TABLE 6
PLAN OF ACTION AND MILLSTONES
1st year 2nd year
















Morale survey —- — — ——
performance, the experiment results may not show significant di (Terences between the
manning systems. Fortunately, the navy keeps independent squadrons at each island
along the Korean territorial waters, which will enhance the separation of this
experiment.
Also, the Navy should plan for operation of the participating vessels and
utilization of rest crews in port. Operations are concentrated at night time. The
problem associated with these night actions is that after coming back to port, the crew
sleeps until 10 AM and begins work. But, during the morning time, after 10 AM, they
are still tired because of the previous night's activities. Most of the crew skips
breakfast. Some of the crew must work for some period immediately after return to
port, for refueling and preparation of necessary reports, or emergency trouble shooting
activities. After lunch, the crew becomes active in preparation for the next night's
activities, and to maintain their platforms. But, during the day time, they are
sometimes involved in other activities, training, ship level education, administrative
activities, and other sea actions. Therefore, defining the multi-crew operation concept is
another central issue. The possible operation concepts are:
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(a) Separating the rest crew from the ship's activities. Rest crews should be
engaged in human maintenance activities, training, advanced education, and
rest. I propose that four weeks continuous duty assignment is appropriate.
(b) Rotate the crew between day and night duties. The Gold crew will be assigned
to day duties which include maintenance and administration. After sunset, at
the end of the normal duty day, the Blue crew will take over the ship and
conduct sea duty. Overall, this suggestion could be facilitated at one common
chain of command, otherwise is may lead toward inefficiency since the Gold
crew's basic assignment is supporting the Blue crew's performance. The
rotation period under this proposal would be six weeks.
Evaluation of the current stage could be viewed as the yardstick in the
evaluation of the experimental results. We should keep in mind this evaluation and
keep track of the experimental results. The evaluation could be categorized as two
central issues: one is productivity of the crew, and the other is improvement of crew
morale. These two could be viewed as quantitative and qualitative aspects of the
benefits.
Education for the Experiment : We should be aware that this kind of modified
manning system has not been previously attempted in the Navy. So, the purpose of the
education is first to let the participants have an overview of the experiment and during
this period, participants' questions are regarded as another diagnosis of the current
stage. Also, feedback of these questions will involve the crew in the experiment. The
navy has to keep in mind other navies' experience, and their reluctance to implement,
which will give the crew opportunity for psychological readiness and learning. The
Navy could learn from these demands for education about crew member desires to be
engaged in rest time and human resources.
b. Implementation Stage
In March, this experiment will start in each squadron. During this stage, the senior
officers interruption of the experiment can be anticipated which derives from their own
perceptions. In many other cases in the management world, many managers are
confound about the behavior of their subordinates because they rely on their own
perceptions of the situation and ignore what their subordinates feel. This may occur
and mislead the experiment. Therefore, once the experimental plan has been
established, implementation should be directed by higher level officers with strong
support of all intermediate officers.
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c. Evaluation Stage
The final stage of the experiment is evaluation and plan for the future. This final
evaluation is discussed later (Data Required). As stated earlier, the plan for the future
should be regarded as a stepping stone for future naval organization development
activity. Therefore, even if the evaluation of the experiment indicates that this form of
multi-crewing is inappropriate, further experimental design will be proposed by the
participants and their superiors, resulting in improvements in naval organizational
effectiveness.
D. DATA REQUIRED
Data required for the experiment are in two categories. One is searching for
supporting evidence to prove productivity of the experiment, which could be viewed as
quantitative data. The other one is to support evidence for improvement of quality of
crew performance, which are the results of the crew morale improvement.
The quantitative data are: operating costs, maintenance costs (direct and
overhead), steaming hours, maintenance hours, training and education hours, and time
available for other assignments. Operating costs and steaming hours will drive
operating costs per hour which could be compared with the conventional manning
system. The maintenance costs and maintenance hours will drive members' productivity
on their maintenance work. The central meaning of this data could be interpreted as
contradictory evidence to critical opinions that multi-crewing will increase absenteeism.
Training and education hours of the participants can be compared directly with
conventionally manned ships, and will reveal any benefits of this manning system.
Proper cross functional utilization of the rest crew will be critical to the success of this
experiment.
There will be increases in some costs, particularly direct costs. Other costs will be
constant, such as certain overhead requirements. It is unlikely that any costs will
decrease. Proper evaluation requires consideration of level of performance so that the
cost per steaming hour should be primary.
The primary source of qualitative data is inspection results of crew performance.
The navy conducts various kinds of inspections, such as maintenance, gunnery,
training, administrative, and crew indoctrination. Crew indoctrination inspections are
evaluations of crew morale and are referred to as Spiritual Inspections. Administrative
and crew indoctrination inspections are similar to the US Navy's Inspector General.
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In this evaluation of crew morale, we should analyze the results in two aspects:
One is improvement in the quality of work life and the other is how much the crew is
motivated by accomplishment of the experiment, which could be interpreted as
expectancy outcome theory.
Elements of productivity are capital investment, innovation, learning (skill and
competence), and motivation and commitment. The first three sources of productivity
are in an organizational environment which enhances motivation and commitment.
People productivity requires four major conditions: motivation, knowledge, actual
capacity, and integration. The more critical issue concerns human resouce development
over time, whether that involves training, career planning, reward systems, or
organization redesign [Ref. 13: p. 37].
Therefore, we should carefully look at how much opportunity and power, plus a
structure for distributing these qualities throughout the work place, provides the link
between productivity and quality of work life. Also, a person's motivation to exert
effort toward a specific level of performance is based on his or her perception of
associations between actions and outcomes. Motivation (M) is expressed as follows:
M - (E-> P) x E[{P-> O) (V}]
The liklihood that a desired performance will lead to various outcomes, is referred to as
the P (performance) to O (outcome) expectancy. Each outcome is given a value, either
positive or negative. The strength of a person's motivation to perform effectively is
influenced by (1) the person's belief that Effort (E) can be converted to Performance
(P), and (2) the net attractiveness of the events that are perceived to stem from good
performance [Ref. 14: p. 71]. Therefore, if participants in the experiment believe their
efforts are to become successful, then that will improve their quality of work and its
expectation will motivate them.
E. EXPECTED RESULTS / LESSONS TO BE LEARNED
The expected results will be both of benefits and cost of the experiment. The
major four benefits are: 1) Quantitative data to explain effectiveness of multi-crewing;
2) Lessons learned regarding management of multi-crewing; 3) Increased motivation,
decreased resistance to multi-crewing; 4) Experienced officers and crew to help future
implementation of multi-crewing.
The quantitative results will be increased productivity of the available resources
engagement. More precisely, reduced cost per steaming hour, as USCG experience
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shows a 44% of increase in productivity (steaming hours) with little increase in
operating cost and maintenance. The anticipated results of the experiment will be less
advantageous than experienced by the USCG. The reasons are differences of the
environmental factors: weather, and current action engagement days. The Korean
territorial waters have more inappropriate time for small ship's operation. Korea has a
longer winter time than most of the U.S., with strong wind and high waves, Summer
time sea conditions are often rough, too. Currently, patrol boats are engaged in both
primary and secondary missions as long as the weather allows. Therefore, this
experiment might reveal little significant improvement in productive days, but hours of
the productive action will show improvement.
Even though, the quantities of the productive action will not be much improved,
the quality of the actions will be much improved. The crews will not perform their at
sea jobs like just waiting time to go to ports. Another outcome is increased time of
training and education of the crews for the primary mission, including cross functional
areas. Therefore, even officers could easily change their assignments from one area to
another, which will require fully different knowledges and different levels of skill. For
example, operating officers could take engineering officers educational courses during
in port time in anticipation of future assignments.
The crew motivation will show significant improvement, since the crew could
take advantage of increased opportunities for self-development and time for cross
training into fields which offer greater opportunities for promotion. These factors will
affect the crew, and the results will reduce the resistance to multi-crewing greatly.
Other dimensional benefits are the potential benefits for the Navy in the future.
Those factors are hard to identify as numerical datas in the short run, but certainly it
will give considerable impact to the Navy, in the long run.
Negative outcomes of the experiment may be: 1) multi-crewing may not be
appropriate in a certain situation, 2) there may be cost overruns, 3) retention may
suffer, or 4) overhead costs may increase.
Multi-crewing may be inappropriate when the patrol boats are taking action
mainly for the primary mission. Those boats are then deployed near the Demilitarized
Zone and maintain high readiness for interdiction of the Northern Korean Navy vessels
invasion. Those patrol boats rarely see real action while the crews are deployed far
from their families and other facilities. Although, productivity may not increase, the
crew could get benefits from the additional crew's existence. They could reduce the
time of being far away from civilized society, and this could be regarded as one benefit.
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In those cases in which the primary mission has more priority than the secondary
mission, the experimental design willl not be appropriate, since the additional cost will
be higher than the benefits. Also, in the long run, retention cost of the excess crew
members will increase and the current situation doesn't allow for implementation of
multi-crewing because of shortage of human resources. Therefore, personnel
assignments and scheduling of ships will become difficult. North Korea has more
Naval vessels than the South. In order to support national defense, more vessels are
required, and are being built by the Navy. These shortage of human resources are
accumulating, as increasingly more new ships are activated.
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V. CONCLUSION
In this thesis, I have analyzed benefits and costs associated with other Navies
experiences in their modified manning systems, and suggested possible ways of
implementation in the Korean Navy. The purposes of this chapter are to explore
what will be the future potential benefits from implementing multi-crewing,
recommendations for future activities, and required further research.
A. POTENTIAL BENEFIT OF MULTT-CREWINGTO ROKN
Basically, the potential benefit to the Navy are lessons to be learned during this
experiment. The Navy has long been concerned with improving organizational
effectiveness. But. those come from management conjectures, not from specific
experiments.
Partly, those judgements are derived from the Navy's experiences through its
history, and those judgments might not be appropriate for the current situation which
is constantly changing. Therefore, we should regard this experiment as a learning
opportunity of organizational processes. The experimental process may raise
unexpected questions which cannot be satisfied.
Lessons learned regarding management of multi-crewing are effective ways of
training, leadership, personnel management, and scheduling of logistics. Methodology
to measure motivation and analysis will be improved, too. Additionally, the Navy
should keep in mind future human resources requirements, especially highly skilled
personnel in specialized functional areas which can not be acquired in a short period of
time. So, in the event of war, the additional crew members could be easily transferred
to newly constructed ships without any unnecessary consumption of training time.
B. RECOMMENDED EXPERIMENT
Expected outcomes of the four proposed alternatives will differ by operating
concepts and depend on which purpose the navy will give more priority. The navy





Two crews per ship
Three crews for two ships
One extended crew per ship
One maintenance team per squadron
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(1) Separating the rest crew from the ship's activities. Rest
crews should be engaged in human maintenance activities,
training, advanced education, and rest. I propose that four
weeks continuous duty assignment is appropriate.
(2) Rotate the crew between day and night duties. The Gold crew
will be assigned to day duties which include maintenance and
administration. After sunset, at the end of the normal duty
day, the Blue crew will take over the ship and conduct sea
duty. Overall, this suggestion could be facilitated at one
common chain of command, otherwise is may lead toward
inefficiency since the Gold crew's basic assignment is
supporting the Blue crew's performance. The rotation period
under this proposal would be six weeks.
The appropriate combinations of each alternative and possible operational
concepts are: Alternatives A and B could utilize (1) above (distinctly separate crews),
since these two alternatives have single crews, members of which would be assigned on
a rotating basis to meet the current table of organization. These crews currently
accomplish their missions without external assistance. The existance of additional crew
members would give them opportunity for other primary mission requirements.
Alternative D could adopt suggestion (1) above with minor adjustment of the
time period. Actually, this crew could have three weeks of free time away from the
vessel after three months of operations. Therefore, the crew could get partial benefit
from the multi-crew manning system which could be motivational incentive to the
crew.
Alternative C is proper for implementation of suggestion (2) (an augmented crew
allowing for rotating assignments) above since this alternative is designed to be heavily
concerned with productivity with a small increase of crew members which could be
engaged in anti-infiltration operations, although they may not be adequately staffed
for their primary mission. This alternative has one common commanding officer who
could take advantage of this manning system for accomplishment of his mission with
greatly reduced difficulty.
The hypothesized desires are 20% increase of the rotating manned crew's
operational readiness ship day at sea.




Alternative A B C D
Operational readiness
ship days at sea
1.3X 1.2X 1.4X IX
Economic cost
Operating cost 1.2X 1.15X 1.25X I.IX
Maintenance cost 1.25X 1.2X 1.3X IX
Additional manpower
requirement
2X 1.5X 1.3X 1.25X
Human resource considerations:
Morale Medium Medium High Low
Retention High Medium Medium Low
Quality of life High Medium Medium Low
Comparison between Alternative A, B and C is that Alternative C would most
greatly increase operational readiness days at sea, since the crew changes every day,
and each crew could perform anti-infiltration operations, while in Alternative A and B,
rest crews are fully separated from the ship and engaged other activities. Therefore,
Alternative A and B limit operation to only one crew and one ship, while Alternative
C could operate one ship with two teams. Comparing productivity of each
alternatives with ship days at sea may not be appropriate. Operational hours might
be more accurate than days, and the anticipated result of Alternative C is 40%
increased operational readiness at sea, which will be similar to 82 foot USCG cutters.
The increase in operational readiness days for the other alternatives are derived from
the study of the USCG. Operating and maintenance cost will increase depending on
operational hours of the ship. The Navy's biggest item of operating cost is fuel
consumption. Propulsion equipment and electric generator maintenance cost will
increase linearly according to operating hours. Therefore, Alternative C will increase
maintenance costs more than the other alternatives.
Human resource considerations are determined according to each manning
system's working conditions. Alternative D will provide similar crew working condition
to the current situation, except for level three maintenance. The crew would be
separated from ship maintenance and engaged other activities. During operational
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periods, the crew should put most of their time in maintaining high readiness.
Alternative C is better than Alternative D, but worse than A and B. Even the lowest
level of improvement in the human factor is better than the current state.
Therefore, Alternative C might be the best model for the Korean Navy, since the
one extended crew per ship could show significant improvement of steaming hours with
little increased resources. Additionally, this alternative has one advantage which is that
the manning system has one common commanding officer. Even though the crews
conduct their duties separately, they would maintain interdependence and commonality
between teams on a daily basis, and during maintenance periods, both teams will
perform their jobs cooperatively. The Commanding Officer of this manning system will
have less difficulty than those with two separate crews per ship and a rotating manning
system. For the Navy unexperienced with multi-crewing, it will lead the experiment to
desired results.
C. FUTURE RESEARCH
Areas for advanced research are: 1) sensitivity analysis of additional members of
the manning system; 2) planning for rest crew utilization; and, 3) development of
effective support logistics.
I have recommended an increase of nine additional members to organize two
separately operating 16 man teams. Would one additional member enhance ship
operation, or would one additional member be revealed as excess?
The purposes of this experimental design are not only maximization of resources
productivity, but also, increasing crew qualification and level of knowledge for the
primary mission of the Navy. This would increase militery readiness, and would be an
additional benefit of multi-crewing. Currently, most crew time is spent on the ship
underway, or preparation for sea, and the crew has limited opportunities for training
and advanced education. The small number of crew members in any specialization
limits effective on the job training. Crew members assigned to formal education
courses are absent from regular duties and the remaining crew members must perform
additional duties to cover the trainee's assignments.
To maximize this modified manning system requires more facilities and other
supporting human resources. The relatively small Navy could improve their
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